No football coach in America is immune to criticism. When things are going bad, you can't hide behind an Axe or a Rose Bowl trophy -- or even a national championship -- so it should come as no surprise that David Shaw, the winningest coach in Stanford history, has had to answer to critics of his coaching decisions and overall philosophy.
Stanford's offensive struggles this season have led many to wonder about certain things. Why isn't the running game more successful? Why don't they abandon the run in favor of the pass? Why isn't this player more involved? Why has that play fallen out of the playbook?
Questions like this will always bubble to the surface when an offense begins to falter, only to be forgotten when a team begins to win, but there is one question that has plagued Shaw throughout his tenure, regardless of how successful the team has been: Why is he so conservative in the fourth quarter?
Shaw followed a typical pattern in last week's game against Arizona State. When his team went ahead by two scores, he immediately shut down the offense. At 20-6 early in the fourth quarter, it appeared as if Shaw had decided that he had enough points; he stopped playing the Sun Devils and began playing the clock. The critics howled during that fourth quarter and long after, arguing that his conservative nature was courting disaster. No matter how successful he had been, they argued, no matter how many conference championships he had won, they claimed, he was doing it wrong. Perhaps he was a good CEO, perhaps he was a good recruiter, perhaps he was the right man to be the face of the program, but he was not a good play caller. He was not a good game manager.
Aside from reminding people of the Rose Bowls we've enjoyed and comparing this era to the dark ages of the past, my counter to this line of thinking has always been to explain what I believe to be David Shaw's core philosophy. With the exception of a few notable outliers like Les Miles or this week's opponent, Mike Leach, football coaches everywhere strive to reduce risk, and Shaw is probably on the extreme end of the conservative spectrum. Almost every critical game decision he makes can be traced to this, so it is extremely rare that any of his decisions surprise me.
He manages a game to eliminate or reduce risk, plain and simple. Consider last week's game. Once his Cardinal had secured that fourteen-point lead in the fourth quarter, the math was on Shaw's side. When Stanford took its first possession of the fourth quarter with 11:11 left on the clock, Shaw knew that the worst case scenario for him -- three possessions totaling nine running plays and no 1st downs -- would burn six minutes off the clock, leaving only five minutes or so for the Devils to score two touchdowns. A 1st down here or there would certainly tighten the vice a bit more, and a score of any kind would make a comeback nearly impossible, but here's where things get tricky.
If David Shaw weren't coaching football, perhaps he would be an insurance agent, studying actuarial tables long into the night, quantifying risk and calculating life expectancy. As a head coach, he does the same. He understood that the surest way to bring Arizona State back into the game would be to turn the ball over, so the obvious course was to eliminate that risk. It would've been nice if Trevor Speights had gained a few more yards and moved the chains once or twice, but that disappointment would've been exponentially worse if K.J. Costello had thrown an interception or been caught by a blindside blitz and coughed up the ball.
The moment many pointed to came after Arizona State had drawn to within seven points. After gaining its only 1st down of the fourth quarter on an eight-yard scramble from Costello, the Cardinal had the ball at the Stanford 46 with 2:45 to play. Speights gained a yard on 1st down and another on 2nd, but those running plays forced the Sun Devils to burn timeouts. On 3rd and 8 Shaw had a choice. Surely he had a play that could gain eight yards, right? With a stable of weapons at Costello's disposal, big receivers who could run slants over the middle and tight ends who could carve out space beyond the line to gain, surely an easy pitch and catch was the way to go to seal the game, right?
But the calculus was simple.
If he were to send in a pass play, probably six different things could happen:
- Pass complete for a 1st down, game over.
- Pass complete short of the sticks.
- Pass incomplete, Sun Devils get to save their final timeout.
- Pass intercepted, disaster.
- Costello sacked, which is worse than a failed run.
- Costello sacked and fumbled, disaster.
If he were to send in a running play, probably three different things could happen:
- Run for a 1st down, game over. (But less likely than throwing for a 1st down.)
- Run short of the marker.
- Fumble, disaster.
If your goal is to eliminate risk and reduce the possibility of losing, the decision is obvious. Speights ran the ball for five yards, Arizona State burned that final timeout, and they took over at their own 15 with 2:20 to play. Yes, they moved the ball all the way to the Stanford 18, but how might that final drive had played out if Shaw hadn't forced them to burn all of their timeouts just to keep the game alive?
Nothing I've outlined above is new information, and none of it will persuade those who believe that coaching to win -- that is, throwing that pass on 3rd and 8 -- is superior to coaching not to lose, as Shaw's end game strategies are commonly described. Rather than simply arguing that not losing is the same as winning, I thought it would be instructional to look at what's happened on the field over the past eight seasons.
As this argument was brewing on Twitter, I asked a simple question -- not because I secretly knew the answer, but because I actually didn't -- has Shaw's conservative fourth quarter play calling ever cost his team a victory?
To answer that question, I decided to look at every game Stanford has lost under David Shaw, all 24 games. (And by the way, regardless of how you feel about Shaw, let's all pause for a moment and join hands as we consider the fact that there have only been 24 losses in these eight years.)
So here's the criteria for my discussion. I'm looking for games like last Thursday night that didn't go in Stanford's direction. I'm looking for games where Stanford had a late lead, but Shaw played not to lose, and ended up losing.
The first thing I did was eliminate the blowout losses, as they aren't worth our analysis. No matter how deep the scars from the games in the chart to the left may be, they aren't relevant here. Nothing Shaw decided in the fourth quarter of these games had any bearing on their outcomes.
So after eliminating these six games from the discussion, we're left with eighteen games on our list. Two of those -- a 26-10 loss to Arizona State in 2014 and last year's 42-24 defeat at USC -- aren't really blowouts, but since those two games weren't really in question in the fourth quarter, we'll eliminate those as well.
So now we're down to a Sour 16, sixteen winnable games, fifteen of which were decided by six points or fewer. So let's take a look. Were any of these games lost because David Shaw was too conservative with a second half lead?
2011 Fiesta Bowl -- Oklahoma State 41, Stanford 38 (OT)
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When I posed my original question on Twitter, this was the game most often mentioned in response, but that's only because the loss was so painful. After the two teams traded scores on five consecutive drives, Stanford's final possession in regulation began with the Cardinal at its own 20 and just 2:25 to play. Andrew Luck passed on five of the first six plays to move the ball to the OSU 25, but Shaw wouldn't let him throw again. Instead Stepfan Taylor ran the ball twice to set up a 35-yard field goal that would've won the game at the gun. Jordan Williamson missed, sending the game to overtime where the Cowboys prevailed. At the time, most fans wished Shaw had allowed the best quarterback in school history to throw the ball just one more time, but he didn't. You could certainly argue that Shaw should've been more aggressive and looked to shorten that field goal attempt, but this game does not fit our criteria. The Cardinal never had the ball with the lead in the fourth quarter.
Verdict: No
2012 -- Washington 17, Stanford 13
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
If you remember this game, you remember it as one of the more frustrating losses of this era. It would still be a few weeks before Kevin Hogan would take over at quarterback, so the offense was struggling. The Cardinal's lone touchdown came on a pick-six from linebacker Trent Murphy, but Stanford still managed to take a 13-10 lead into the fourth quarter. Instead of nursing that lead, Shaw played rather aggressively, asking quarterback Josh Nunes to throw on four of six plays on the first drive of the quarter, and then on two of three plays (one pass, one sack) on the next series. This game was lost because of execution, not offensive philosophy.
Verdict: No
2012 -- Notre Dame 20, Stanford 13 (OT)
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
The Washington loss was frustrating, but this game was a crime. Stanford never led after the third quarter, and an atrocious series of officiating negated two potential touchdowns in overtime.
Verdict: No
2013 -- Utah 27, Stanford 21
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
The Cardinal trailed 24-14 heading into the fourth quarter. This was probably a bad loss, but conservatism had nothing to do with it.
Verdict: No
2013 -- USC 20, Stanford 17
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You could actually argue that this loss came about because Shaw wasn't conservative enough. The game was tied through much of the second half, but that changed with Stanford's last meaningful possession. Sophomore Kevin Hogan threw an interception at midfield, the Trojans drove 27 yards, and a field goal won the game for USC.
Verdict: No
2013 Rose Bowl -- Michigan State 24, Stanford 20
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
This was another popular game offered in response to my query. Yes, the Cardinal led 10-0 after the first quarter and 17-14 at the half, but they never held a lead in the fourth quarter. The common criticism is that the ball should've been pitched outside on 4th and 1 on Stanford's final possession, but that's just one play call.
Verdict: No
2014 -- USC 13, Stanford 10
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
One of the craziest games in Stanford history. Every single Stanford possession reached at least the USC 32, but a comedy of errors prevented victory. Oh, and how conservative is this? With a 10-7 lead in the third quarter, Shaw faced 4th and 1 from the USC 2 and eschewed the field goal, choosing instead to keep his offense on the field. They didn't get the 1st down. It was that kind of day.
Verdict: No
2014 -- Notre Dame 17, Stanford 14
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
The Cardinal took a late lead in the fourth quarter at 14-10, but Notre Dame took the lead right back on their next possession. Nothing to see here. Move along.
Verdict: No
2014 -- Utah 20, Stanford 17 (2 OT)
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
After Utah tied the game at 7 in the second quarter, the two teams traded twelve consecutive punts before scoring a touchdown each in overtime. The Utes won in double overtime. Probably rock bottom for the David Shaw era.
Verdict: No
2015 -- Northwestern 16, Stanford 6
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
Perhaps the most infamous loss of the last decade, a defeat which probably cost the Cardinal a shot at the national championship. This game was just awful. It probably doesn't even deserve to be on this list, because Stanford was never really in this game.
Verdict: No
2015 -- Oregon 38, Stanford 36
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Okay, this was probably the game that cost the 2015 a shot at the national championship. Oregon took a 28-23 lead when they scored on the first possession of the second half, and they never trailed after that. Were it not for two fumbled snaps and a missed two-point conversion in the final seconds, Stanford still might've pulled this one out, but they didn't.
Verdict: No
2016 -- Colorado 10, Stanford 5
Play-By-Play
Ugly, ugly, ugly. The Cardinal turned the ball over four times, including the last three possessions of the game, and Stanford's last two points came courtesy of an intentional safety. Ugly, ugly, ugly.
Verdict: No
2017 -- San Diego State 20, Stanford 17
Play-By-Play
Neither team was ever able to take control of this game, but the Cardinal did have a chance. Bryce Love scored a touchdown on the first play of the fourth quarter to give his team a 17-13 lead, and the Cardinal did get the ball back with that same four-point lead and 9:54 to play. The ensuing possession wasn't positive, but it can't be called conservative. The game was still hanging in the balance, so Shaw was clearly playing to move the ball and get 1st downs. After earning one, however, a false start and a sack doomed the drive. An incompletion on 3rd and 12 gave the ball back to the Aztecs, they pounded the ball down the field, and the game was over.
Verdict: No
2017 -- Washington State 24, Stanford 21
Play-By-Play
At first glance, this looks like the game. Stanford had a 21-17 second half advantage and had two opportunities to build that lead. But instead of stepping on the Cougars' throats, the offense produced two three-and-outs, and Washington State came back to steal a win. But let's look at those possessions. The last series of the third quarter went run, pass, pass, punt, and the first series of the fourth quarter was similar -- pass, run, pass, punt. Washington State scored on a long drive immediately after that to take the lead, and the Cardinal was never able to answer. Sometimes, you just lose.
Verdict: No
2017 Pac-12 Championship Game -- USC 31, Stanford 28
Play-By-Play
Stanford never led in this game.
Verdict: No
2017 Alamo Bowl -- TCU 39, Stanford 27
Play-By-Play|GMC Recap
This game turned on two big plays in the fourth quarter -- a 93-yard passing touchdown and a 76-yard punt return three minutes later. There was nothing remotely conservative about this shootout.
Verdict: No
So there you have it. You can certainly blame Shaw for some of these losses, either because you disagree with his game plan or the personnel he put on the field, but his conservative fourth quarter approach played no part in any of these defeats.
